Abstract: As critical piece of China's gradualist economic transition, domestic price reform still faces major challenges. In particular, factor price, which is still tightly-controlled and not market-based, is lower than market equilibrium price. Factor price distortion not only reduces market efficiency but also affects wealth distribution. Subsequent wealth transfer has, over the past ten to fifteen years, created a powerful vested interests and spawned social resentment, both of which may constitute major hazards in China's future reform and development. Keeping in mind that China will have to address factor price distortion in its next step of reform, this paper takes stock of China's journey toward price reform; examines the relationship among factor price distortion, previous economic growth, and policy; and estimates the size of resulting wealth transfer.
I. Introduction
Gradualist reform is one of the hallmarks of China's economic transition. As stated by Young (2000) , while this reform strategy has achieved great successes, it has also failed to solve many continuing problems due to dependence on previous policy. Price reform is a good example. After thirty years of reform, although the prices of most final commodities have become market-based, prices of many production factors such as land, natural gas, and electricity are still under government control. Despite criticism from Chinese academia on price controls 1 Economic theories tell us that price distortion reduces the efficiency of resource allocation. If such distortion appears in the factors at the bottom of production chain, the negative impacts , reform of production factor pricing has been slow.
Aside from institutional inertia, control of production factor prices is largely an outcome of China's economic policies, which revolve around ensuring growth and stability. On the one hand, under-pricing of production factors has increased revenue for producers and is thus conducive to stimulating investment. Cheap factors are still a main reason behind the competitiveness of Chinese products in the international market. In addition, controlling production factor price is a powerful tool that can contain economic overheating and slow the increase of overall price levels caused by Balassa-Samuelson effect. Thus, price reform affects not only the macroeconomic environment but is tied into China's social stability as well. Due to these considerations, China's central government has treaded carefully on the issue.. would be even more serious. For China, a country in the process of economic transition, price distortion of production factors has another significant consequence that is in income distribution. Control of production factor prices leads directly to the transfer of wealth from factor owners to other users Consequences of price distortion in China have already been discussed by some scholars. Xu (1993) estimated the degree of price distortion in various economic sectors using a computable general equilibrium model. Garbaccio (1994) estimated the effects of relaxed and enhanced price control of various sectors on profits, output, and employment. This paper will pay greater attention to the analysis of factor pricing from the perspective of political economy, i.e. the effects of price distortion on various interests. We aim to identify reasons why this system may be slow to reform, as well as its social and economic consequences. As Qin et al. (2009) found, inequalities in income distribution could have a significant effect on China's macroeconomic stability and growth. This paper also considers the relationship between rent-seeking from natural resources and economic growth. Additionally, as indicated by Tornell (1992) , Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik (2002) , vested interests' struggle for resource rents will threaten long-term economic growth. Our concern, in turn, is that the enormous vested interests generated by price distortion in China's production factors are highly likely to contribute to such instability. This paper is structured as follows: Part II is a brief overview and discussion of China's price reform; Part III discusses the relationship between the control of production factor prices and export-oriented economic policies through modeling; Part IV provides an empirical analysis that estimates the size of domestic and international wealth transfer caused by factor prices; and Part V offers conclusions.
II. China's price reform: overview and discussion
Price adjustment began at the inception of China's economic reform. At that time, China's price reform followed a strategy of prioritization, differentiation, and double-tracking. Reform of commodity prices and the development of a commodities market outpaced those of factor prices and factor markets. Prices of agricultural products and industrial consumables were the first to be deregulated, followed by prices of intermediate inputs. At present, except for a few types of products, China has deregulated all commodity prices 2 With the implementation of the household contract responsibility system in the early period of reform and opening, raising grain prices became the main thrust of policies aimed at stimulating economic growth. Between 1979 and 1984 , the purchasing prices of 18 categories of agricultural and sideline products increased by 22.1 per cent. Later, China began to reduce fixed quotas for purchasing and marketing, increase negotiated purchase and marketing, and deregulate the prices of agricultural and sideline products. Given the great success of rural reform, price reform began to be carried out in cities in 1984. At the beginning, regulatory price re-adjustment still held sway.
. In this respect, China has established a basic market economy. Reform of factor prices and opening of a factor market, on the other hand, have been much slower; government regulation is still visible..
In an attempt to restore macroeconomic balance, China launched a thorough price reform effort involving interlocked pricing, tax, and fiscal changes. The result was serious inflation and skyrocketing demand, which led to social dislocation and the political turmoil of 1989. As a result, price reform was shelved, and reform in all areas came to a halt until Deng Xiaoping's speeches on economic reform during his tour of southern China in 1992.
Before the re-initiation of reform, China maintained regulatory power over the size of loans, interest rates, and access to the financial industry. In 1993, China began to undertake financial reform, marked by the enactment of Decisions on Matters Concerning the Establishment of A Socialist Market Economy and Decisions of the State Council on the Reform of the Financial System. China canceled its restrictions on the size of loans in 1998, deregulated interest rates in inter-bank markets and implemented and expanded the floating scope of loan interest rates in 1996, and relaxed control on the upper limit of loan interest rates for commercial banks in 2004 (Monetary Policy Analysis Panel, the People's Bank of China, 2005) . Officially, the central bank still regulates the lower limit of loan interest rates and the upper limit of savings interest rates, although there is often a large discrepancy between the official interest rate and private interest rates (see Figure 1 ). Prior to and during the initial stages of reform, China adopted strict foreign exchange controls and a fixed exchange rate system, with the foreign exchange rate highly over-valued. As the exchange rate depreciated and China began to implement foreign exchange reserve holdings, and foreign exchange quota transaction systems, a system developed under which the official exchange rate, the black market exchange rate, and the foreign exchange quota transaction exchange rate existed side by side. In 1994, exchange rate reform helped achieve exchange rate integration, which occurred in sync with rapid exchange rate depreciation. After excessive depreciation, the renminbi exchange rate began a slow process of appreciation. In 1996, China acceded to GATT and began to phase in free convertibility under current accounts. In 1998, with the eruption of the Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese government declared it would not devalue the renminbi and decided to re-adopt a fixed exchange rate system. Afterwards, the short-lived expectation of depreciation was replaced by the expectation of long-term appreciation beginning in 2002. The reform of the foreign exchange system on July 21, 2005 phased in the managed floating exchange rate system and gradually relaxed some capital account restrictions. Since then, the renminbi has appreciated slightly. Due to foreign exchange controls and a weakening U.S. dollar, the renminbi had appreciated by a cumulative 10.89 per cent against the US dollar as of November 23, 2007, while having depreciated by 9.59 per cent against the euro. According to a report by the World Bank, China's PPP-based exchange rate was 3.4 . On the whole, it is clear that the renminbi exchange rate is undervalued.
In China, land resources and the land market are controlled mainly by local governments. The current land system in China is a hybrid system in which collective land and state-owned land and farmland and construction land are administered according to different systems. In rural areas, the primary distribution and redistribution of land-use rights are conducted by village-level organizations. In many parts of rural China, land contract rights cannot be freely transferred or traded: the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land requires both government approval and land acquisition by the government as an intermediary step before the land is used for non-agricultural construction. In the process of land acquisition, compensation awarded to the original user is based on the value of losses rather than on the market price. This has led to a huge discrepancy between land acquisition cost and land transfer price (see Figure 2 ) and has constituted a major source of government revenue.
As with land, the acquisition and revenue distribution of other natural resources in China such as petroleum, natural gas, and coal are not determined by the market. Resource royalties are tantamount to an administrative fee, and amounts are much lower than average resource prices in the market. Valuable intangible resources such as television, broadcasting, and wireless communication channels, among others, are also offered for industry use at exceedingly low prices (Zhang, 2006) . Due to free access to and symbolic pricing of resources, the pricing mechanism of resource goods is distorted by incomplete price composition, an excessively low price level, and unreasonable price parity relations. Despite multiple price increases, resource royalties have always been tightly regulated. Although China has attempted to address several unreasonable price parity relations, such as coal and electricity prices within China and between domestic and international oil prices, these measures have failed to be properly implemented and achieve expected results. Since reform and opening-up in 1978, as food supply became less of a problem and control over residence registration loosened, China began to witness a massive migration of rural dwellers to cities, which has continued to the present day. Although this inflow of labor was responsible for the development of an informal labor market in urban areas, institutional barriers between China's urban and rural areas have remained high. Local governments and industries are preoccupied with economic performance, neglecting safety, hygiene, and working conditions. In urban formal labor markets, on the other hand, employers and employees are given freedom of choice and the right to termination, enabled by multiple reforms in organization, dismissal, early retirement, and lump-sum severance pay. General labor prices are also deregulated. Salaries of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and skilled workers, however, are still under regulatory control.
In a word, the market-oriented reforms of capital, land, and labor are far from complete, and prices are still largely under regulatory control. Factor prices are seriously undervalued and price parity relations between factors and products are artificially distorted. In short, government control of and dominance in the market for production factors has been a hallmark of the modern Chinese economy (Zhang Shuguang, 2007) .
III. Factor price distortion: causes and effects (I) Export-led growth strategy, inflation, and factor under-pricing
Consider an open economy that adopts a fixed exchange rate system and includes two sectors of tradable goods and non-tradable goods. Nominal total demand in this economy can be expressed as: 
Where τ is the government tax rate and F C is basic consumer demand. Consumer demand as it is expressed in the above formula means that households must first use their disposable income to satisfy certain basic consumer needs. Then, consumption and savings are divided, using c λ proportion of income to represent consumption and the remainder to indicate savings. The realistic background of this assumption is that major uncertainties during an economic transition make it difficult for people to properly assess future income, spending, and investment returns. In this case, they can only adopt a simple set of income distribution rules. Psychological aversion to risk also lessens the share of consumption in income C λ and raises the savings rate.
Economically desirable nominal investment demand is a linear function of nominal total demand. It can only be fulfilled after consumer demand. Hence:
The Chinese government practices operating on a balanced budget, thus: 
This means that under conditions where output capacity exceeds basic consumer demand, the economy cannot achieve a sufficient utilization of resources.
We choose to focus, however, on another situation, i.e. one in which the government promotes economic expansion through spending and export in order to avoid the problem of insufficient consumption. Thus,
Equation (1) gives us:
Subsequently, the above demand is decomposed into tradable and non-tradable goods sectors. The Cobb-Douglas utility function applies to households:
where T y and N y are acquired tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. We then use a first-order condition of maximal utility: 
Government spending is complex, as it includes both consumption and investment. For purposes of this paper, we assume that the proportions of and investments in tradable goods and non-tradable goods are equal, i.e.:
Obviously, net export is equivalent to all tradable goods, hence:
Summarizing the above expressions and replacing nominal total demand with
give us the relationship between tradable goods and non-tradable goods:
( )
Regarding the supply side, we calculate the production function of tradable goods and non-tradable goods:
and i Z are capital, labor, and resource (such as energy, land, and ores) inputs for the two sectors. T A and N A are the production coefficients of both sectors. We assume α θ > , β ϕ < and γ ω < , i.e. that the production of tradable goods is relatively capital-intensive, while the production of non-tradable goods requires more labor and resources. We reason that most tradable goods are industrial goods, while the greater part of non-tradable goods is closely related to non-tradable factor inputs, such as land, both in the service and consumption phases. Capital, labor, and total resource inputs in the economy are K , L , and Z respectively, hence:
Minimization of production cost gives the following first-order conditions:
where r , w , and h represent interest rates, wage rates, and resource prices, respectively.
Combining the production functions of both sectors using equations (4) and (7) gives us:
Substituting equation (3) gives us:
By the same token, the distribution of labor and resources in both sectors can be represented as follows:
Substituting into the production functions of both sectors gives us:
According to equation (3), the nominal total output value of the economy can be expressed as:
Assuming that the tax rate, marginal consumption, and investment tendency remain constant, the nominal GDP growth rate can be expressed as follows:
Because of the fixed exchange rate system, prices of tradable goods are determined exogenously. We assume that international prices of tradable goods remain constant, i.e.
and that the economic growth rate is subject to technological progress plus factor inputs. At the same time, equation (10) gives us the relative price ratio between non-tradable goods and tradable goods.
( ) 
Taking the differential of both sides gives us:
We assume 
Given the constant prices of tradable commodities, we calculate:
Comparing equation (13) with equation (11) and with our analysis on equation (12), we can see that under the fixed exchange rate system, economic growth driven primarily by technological progress and capital accumulation will inevitably be accompanied by a certain degree of inflation. If the government wishes to keep inflation low during periods of high growth, price controls to expand the supply of labor and resources are a necessary tool.
(II) Factor price control and income transfer
We examine the income transfer process produced by price controls using the resources sector in the above model as our example. If the resource sector contains n types of specific resources used as inputs for the whole of production, we get:
where i z is type i of the specific resource of price i p . For each type of specific resource, we assume an intermediary dealer who acquires resources from owners at purchasing price Substituting equation (14) into the production function of the tradable goods sector gives us:
where Ti z is the specific resource input for the tradable goods sector. The first-order condition of profit maximization on final products for producers is:
If we assume multiple types of resources, the market influence of individual resource intermediary dealers is negligible. Hence, we use 
Ignoring of the high order infinitesimal gives us the following approximation:
Of course, depending on the size of cost change, the direction of income change can vary. Here, we examine primarily 0 Ci π ∆ < and the existence of resource "oversupply" relative to optimal time discount rate. Change to the income of intermediary dealers is:
which we can approximate as:
In contrast to resource owners, intermediary dealers' revenue after price adjustment is always positive and in direct proportion to the degree of price adjustment. In other words, one consequence of price adjustment is the transfer of income from resource owners to intermediary dealers.
The above model has many implications for policy and resource purchasing. First of all, despite the model's indication that income transfer is caused by the purchasing price of resources, it offers no clear indication of how income transfer affects social welfare overall. This is partially because we did not specifically define the social cost of inflation in our model. Another important reason lies in the market structure of resource supplies. The monopolistic position of intermediary dealers has caused (upward) distortion in the market prices of resources. This implies that government control of purchasing prices will compromise the interests of resource owners to some extent, but it will primarily help overcome the distortion caused by monopolistic pricing of intermediary dealers. Thus, the overall effect seems to be positive. On the other hand, however, any practice that aims to offset price distortion with another price distortion may wreak even greater havoc on the economy, giving rise to long-term effects that are difficult to predict. As a result, a question that arises is why the government has thus far refrained from directly controlling market prices set by intermediary dealers. While this kind of intervention has been implemented, it has only been minimally successful; this is due to the government's disadvantage vis-à-vis information access and negotiation capabilities 4 1. Wealth transfer to administrative monopolistic sectors . Lastly, certain resources, such as petroleum and the wireless spectrum, play a far greater role in the economy than the model suggests. Suppliers of these resources also wield far more market power. In this respect, their behavior could be seen as more akin to oligarchic competition than to monopolistic competition in the market. This being said, the relationship between price distortion and income transfer , as well as its mechanism, are roughly consistent with our model.
IV. Simple estimate of wealth transfer (I) Domestic wealth transfer caused by factor price distortion
The effects of wealth transfer domestically caused by factor price undervaluation are threefold: first, wealth transfer from general sectors to administrative monopolistic sectors; second, wealth transfer from individuals to the government; and third, wealth transfer from workers to asset owners.
China's administrative monopoly is concentrated in seven industries: tobacco, electricity, petroleum mining and processing, transportation, postal and telecom services, broadcasting and television, and finance and insurance 5 . Table 1 Note: ① is total national economy, not including the agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry sectors; ② is the share of monopolistic sectors in the national economy; and ③ is the share of monopolistic sectors in the national economy, not including the agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry sectors.
Source: Calculated using input/output (producer price) sheets for 122 sectors for 2002 from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
The above table indicates that these 16 monopolistic sectors show larger shares of depreciation and operating surplus than value added. Whether the agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry are included or excluded, their share of operating surplus exceeds the share of their value added by roughly nine percentage points, or 50 per cent. It is likely, moreover, that their share of depreciation and operating surplus has been even higher in recent years. Before 2007, state-owned monopolistic enterprises had retained all their own profits. Measured against the share of value added, the transfer of social wealth to monopolistic sectors in 2002 may have been as high as 213.5 to 241.7 billion yuan. In other words, due to relative price distortion, the social wealth transferred to monopolistic sectors accounts for 32.6 per cent to 36.9 per cent of their total operating surplus.
Although the share of wages for monopolistic sectors is lower than value added, their share of employment takes an even smaller share. Excluding agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry, wages in monopolistic sectors still show a higher share than that of their total employment by 1.21 percentage points, i.e. 12.3 per cent. In monopolistic sectors, moreover, per capita wages are higher than the national average by 5,335 yuan. If the excess wages are included in our calculations, wealth transferred to China's monopolistic sectors in 2002 amounts to between 268.9 and 297.1 billion yuan, which constitutes 18.5 to 20.4 per cent of national income in monopolistic sectors. If the depreciation rate in monopolistic sectors is equal to the national average, the wealth transfer to monopolistic sectors would still increase by between 108.6 and 140.9 billion yuan, reaching a total of more than 400 billion yuan and accounting for more than 21.5 per cent of value added in monopolistic sectors. In the past five years, China's GDP has shown an average annual growth rate of 10.6 per cent, and profits from industrial sectors have grown by 33.9 per cent, both figures higher than their 2002 levels (9.1 per cent and 22.2 per cent, respectively). Monopolistic sectors experienced even faster growth of profits, with some shares constituting an even higher proportion of the national economy. Hence, wealth transfer to monopolistic sectors in the past five years is faster and larger than ever.
Wealth transfer to the government
The Chinese government is the principle controller of resources, especially land resources.
Undervaluation of factor prices, therefore, has caused wealth to be transferred from individuals to the government. Figure 3 and Table 2 show this dimension of domestic wealth transfer in detail. Figure 3 calculates the growth of urban and rural household incomes using national census information and compares them with the growth of fiscal revenue. Except for 2002, when urban household income growth was slightly higher than fiscal revenue, and 2003, when urban and rural household income growth rates are relatively close, government revenue growth has been much higher than household income growth over the past decade. While urban and rural households' annual average revenue growth rates over the past ten years were18.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent, respectively, government revenue growth was 1.71 times higher than urban household revenue growth. Table 2 calculates the consumption, savings, disposable income, and the shares of disposable income among government, households, and the commercial sector according to adjusted cash flow statements (in-kind transactions) from Historical Information on China's Cash Flow Statements:1992 . Figures indicate that between 1995 , the savings and consumption rates rose for the government sector, while the share of its disposable income rose from 16.55 per cent to 18.90 per cent, reaching a peak of 22 per cent in 2003. On the other hand, saving and consumption rates for the household sector declined steadily; the share of household disposable incomes, in particular, dropped from 67.23 per cent to 57.83 per cent, down almost ten percentage points. Disposable income in the commercial sector increased dramatically after 2000.
The above tables provides a description of wealth transfer to the government in recent years using available information. This description, however, is insufficient. Fiscal revenue describes only government budgetary revenue, not all government revenue. This is illustrated by the relative share of disposable income to fiscal revenue. For instance, in 2004 the government's disposable income was 3,052.2 billion yuan; fiscal revenue, on the other hand, was 2,639.647 billion. The former exceeds the latter by 412.553 billion yuan. We believe the figures for disposable income more accurately reflect China's current fiscal situation; the answer depends, however, on China's current fiscal system, as well as the methods used to generate government revenues.
Under China's current fiscal system, government revenues are generated in four ways: the first is budgetary revenue. This figure is usually accurate for its scope. The revenue, seemingly not a big portion, is often cited by Chinese tax authorities in response to criticism from international community 6 . The second source of revenue is extra-budgetary revenue. This figure also in official statistics. According to estimates, the proportion of budgetary to extra-budgetary revenue was roughly 1:1 before the Chinese government launched an initiative to lower it to 1:0.6 7 Extra-budgetary revenue has two principle sources: land transfer fees and social security revenue. Over the years, land transfer fees have constituted a major source of local extra-budgetary revenue, and the difference between land purchasing fees paid by real estate developers and the amount of compensation to lessees is only a small part. In 2004, China's land transfer fees amounted to 589.4 billion yuan. In 2005, they reached 550.5 billion yuan (land purchase fees were less than 300 billion yuan that year). In 2006, they exceeded 700 billion yuan and, according to economist Ping Xinqiao's estimate, exceeded one trillion yuan . If we assume the lower proportion is correct, China's extra-budgetary revenue in 2004 was 1,683.7 billion yuan.
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Excessively low resource factor rents not only increase profits in monopolistic sectors but also magnify their profits from general commodities. As a result of artificially increased profits, . The third type of government revenue is extra-system revenue, which lacks reliable estimates. In the early 1990s, using information from surveys, Fan Gang estimated that the extra-system revenue of various levels of government in the year 1994 accounted for 30 per cent of local budgetary revenue. In Table 2 , government disposable income is less than the sum of budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue by 57.365 billion yuan (= 3,052.2 billion yuan -2,639.647 billion yuan -469.918 billion yuan).
Lastly, government revenue also takes the form of levying fees on the commercial sector for routine tasks. These statistics are even less available. Putting these four sources of revenue together, the share of government disposable revenue in the nation's GDP is rather high. To illustrate, if from 2000 to 2004 the household consumption rate and the investment rate fell to their average levels during the period from 1995 to 1999, and government disposable income maintained its average increase over those years,, wealth transfer from individuals to the government would amount to 1,573.911 billion yuan, or 314.782 billion yuan per year. In 2003, this figure would be as high as 575.229 billion yuan.
Wealth transfer to asset owners
China is in the process of asset revaluation, an important economic phenomenon that occurs as developing economies transition to developed economies. As the lesson of history demonstrates, however, the process of asset price revaluation is fraught with risks and is often accompanied by rapid increases in asset prices and asset bubble inflation. Artificial undervaluation of factor and resource prices will pull down the prices of general commodities and distort the price parity relationship between general commodities and asset prices, causing wealth to transfer to asset owners.
the market value of assets will inevitably be overvalued. This is demonstrated by the fact that asset price inflation in China has been much higher compared to the general commodity price inflation. Between 1997 and the third quarter of 2007, China's CPI increased by only 10.96 per cent, while RPI decreased by 1.65 per cent, with growth rates of 0.1 per cent and -0.2 per cent per year, respectively. However, asset price inflation increased at a faster rate. During this period, real estate sales prices rose 80.74 per cent and stock price indices ballooned to 3.65 times their previous levels, i.e., a growth rate of 6.1 per cent and 16.6 per cent per year, respectively. In the past few years, asset price inflation has become even more rampant. Real increases of property prices are much higher than official statistics. Figure 4 indicates the share of labor wage, net production tax, and depreciation plus operating surplus in GDP. While the share of wages declined annually, dropping from 52. In China, as factor and resource prices have been kept artificially low, it has caused reverse wealth transfers both within China as well as internationally; specifically, wealth has flowed from China, a relatively poor country, to richer countries in Europe and America. Under a price system that distorts relative domestic and international prices, international wealth transfer has taken place primarily through trade and capital flow. On the one hand, subsidies to foreign countries developed as Chinese exports increased, a result of undervalued trade commodity prices, which itself was a result of undervaluing domestic factor and resource prices. Similarly, on the other hand, another form of exporter subsidy has arisen from import losses caused by international commodity price inflation and appreciation of the renminbi. Exchange rate losses and discounts have also caused wealth to flow out of China. Table 3 lists price indices of international bulk commodities and domestic industrial goods, as well as purchasing prices of energy, raw materials, and power. Over the past ten years, prices of international bulk commodities increased by a factor of 1.2. Metal prices, for example, rose by a factor of 1.7, while energy prices increased to 3.4 times that of previously levels. Prices of domestic retail commodities, by comparison, saw hardly any change. Purchasing prices of energy and raw materials increased only 33 per cent. Outside China, prices of industrial goods increased 1.8 times, while ex-factory prices in China grew by only 12 per cent. These figures indicate that international wealth transfer is taking place on a large scale. The size of international wealth transfer is difficult to estimate primarily due to lack of availability of domestic and international price information. We estimate the subsidies to foreign countries resulting from the difference between domestic and overseas energy and metals prices. Strategies and Support Measures, page 66, 180, 197 and 218. China Statistical Yearbook (2006) . Notes: 1. Consumption quantity equals production quantity plus import quantity minus export quantity; 2. Manufacturing consumption quantity is calculated as follows: total consumption quantity multiplied by the share of manufacturing intermediate inputs. As 2004 information is not available, this share is calculating using statistics from 2002 inputs and outputs.
3. Consumption in export sector is equal to manufacturing consumption quantity multiplied by the share of industrial finished goods in total manufacturing output.
4. Calculated according to the difference between domestic price and import price; 5. Calculated according to the difference between domestic price and import price; 6. Electrolytic aluminum. Using the difference between domestic and overseas prices as our base, we calculated the export subsidies for energy and major metals (steel, copper, and aluminum) in 2004; these subsidies, in turn, arose from price undervaluation in the range of 118.167 billion yuan to185.454 billion yuan. Considering the degree to which other resource factors are undervalued, we estimate that subsidies to foreign consumers would be many times higher than this figure. Given that the output of energy and metals accounts for 16.33 per cent of total intermediate inputs (output), corresponding export subsidies could have reached as much as 723.619 to 1,135.664 billion yuan, or 87.427 to137.211 billion US dollars, which would have accounted for 14.74 to 23.13 per cent of China's total exports that year. This figure indicates the massive scale of reverse wealth transfer resulting from undervaluation of resource factor.
V. Conclusions
In a planned economy, factor price controls are a strategic way for government to control the economy and promote growth. Today, 30 years since reform and opening, however, China has failed to resolve this problem in the context of becoming an emerging market economy and participating in global trade. This suggests that China's transition towards a market economy is far from complete. We argue that causes go beyond institutional inertia and are an inevitable result of economic policies targeted at growth and stability. Current policies must be reviewed from the strategic perspective of China's unique development path if the Chinese government is to launch reform in the real sense.
Factor price distortion has obvious consequences. Aside from losses in the efficiency of resource allocation, it produces wealth transfer among different social groups. Based on this paper's estimates, wealth transfer is of a scale larger than previously imagined; as China continues to reform and develop, the increasingly disproportionate power of vested interests and the resulting social resentment are likely to be a major hazard. It is a question that must be addressed in the next step of China's reform.
